Inquiry Question: Is the Mystery Memo a valid document?
Claim: Yes, the Mystery Memo is a valid document. Although the McCollum Memo is a confidential U.S document, the document is real.
Evidence: All pieces of evidence is found below with reasoning underneath.
Claim: Yes, the Mystery Memo is a valid document. Although the McCollum Memo is a confidential U.S document, the document is real.
Evidence: All pieces of evidence is found below with reasoning underneath.
Action F (the 6th action of the McCollum Memo) advised the US to keep the United States Fleet based in Hawaiian Waters. During a luncheon with James O. Richardson and William D. Leahy, FDR stated the proposal. When Richardson heard FDR's plan, his response was, "Mr. President, senior officers of the navy do not have the trust and the confidence in the civilian leadership of this country that is essential for the successful prosecution of a war in the Pacific." Richardson recalls the president saying that "Sooner or later the Japanese would commit an overt act against the United States and the nation would be willing to enter the war.
Sourcing: Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor by Robert Stinnett
Reasoning: The evidence above shows that Richardson didn't approve of FDR's willingness to put a Navy ship in danger in order to provoke a "Japanese mistake." It also shows that FDR wanted to follow through with Action F, or the 6th step of the McCollum memo, which was to keep the main strength of the U.S Fleet now in the Pacific in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands.
Sourcing: Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor by Robert Stinnett
Reasoning: The evidence above shows that Richardson didn't approve of FDR's willingness to put a Navy ship in danger in order to provoke a "Japanese mistake." It also shows that FDR wanted to follow through with Action F, or the 6th step of the McCollum memo, which was to keep the main strength of the U.S Fleet now in the Pacific in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands.
Roosevelt dispatched his closest adviser and the Secretary of the War Cabinet, Harry Hopkins, to meet British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in January 1941. Hopkins told Churchill: "The President is determined that we [the United States and England] shall win the war together.
Sourcing: http://www.thenewamerican.com/culture/history/item/4740-pearl-harbor-hawaii-was-surprised-fdr-was-not
Reasoning: The quote expresses the fact that FDR had every intention of entering the war on Britain's side, although he repeatedly stated to the public that he would keep the U.S out of war and remain neutral.
Sourcing: http://www.thenewamerican.com/culture/history/item/4740-pearl-harbor-hawaii-was-surprised-fdr-was-not
Reasoning: The quote expresses the fact that FDR had every intention of entering the war on Britain's side, although he repeatedly stated to the public that he would keep the U.S out of war and remain neutral.
Reasoning: The phone call is dated on December 7th, 1941; the day of Pearl Harbor. If you pay attention to the conversation above, you can tell that FDR didn't seem too worried about the events that had just taken place. All his responses are very short, and don't give too much away. He just doesn't come off as worried or surprised.
"Almost as soon as the attacks occurred, conspiracy theorists began claiming that President
Roosevelt had prior knowledge of the assault on Pearl Harbor. Others have claimed he tricked
the Japanese into starting a war with the United States as a “back door” way to go to war with
Japan’s ally, Nazi Germany.
The causes behind the Japanese attack are complex and date back to the 1930s, when Japan
undertook a military/colonial expansion in China—culminating in a full-scale invasion in 1937.
America opposed this expansion and used a variety of methods to try to deter Japan.
During the late 1930s, FDR began providing limited support to the Chinese government. In
1940, Roosevelt moved the Pacific fleet to the naval base at Pearl Harbor as a show of
American power. He also attempted to address growing tensions with Japan through diplomacy.
When Japan seized southern French Indo-China in July 1941, Roosevelt responded by freezing all
Japanese assets in the United States and ending sales of oil to Japan. Japan’s military
depended upon American oil. Japan then had to decide between settling the crisis through
diplomacy or by striking deep into Southeast Asia to acquire alternative sources of oil, an action
that was certain to meet American opposition.
Japan chose to continue its diplomatic talks with the United States while at the same time
secretly preparing for a coordinated assault throughout the Pacific. Japan’s leaders hoped that a
surprise attack on Pearl Harbor would destroy American resolve and cripple the American navy
for at least six months, giving Japan time to consolidate its new empire."
Sourcing: The collections of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum
The President has today issued an Executive Order freezing Japanese assets in the United States in the same manner in which assets of various European countries were frozen on June 14, 1941. This measure, in effect, brings all financial and import and export trade transactions in which Japanese interests are involved under the control of the Government, and imposes criminal penalties for violation of the Order.
This Executive Order, just as the Order of June 14, 1941, is designed among other things to prevent the use of the financial facilities of the United States and trade between Japan and the United States, in ways harmful to national defense and American interests, to prevent the liquidation in the United States of assets obtained by duress or conquest, and to curb subversive activities in the United States.
Sourcing: Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Executive Order 8832 - Freezing Japanese and Chinese Assets in the United States," July 26, 1941. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16148.
Reasoning: The information above shows that FDR followed through with completing Action H, or the eighth step of the McCollum memo, which was to completely embargo all U.S trade with Japan, in collaboration with a similar embargo imposed by the British empire.
The memo was read by Captain Knox, who wrote on Page 6 that the US should NOT provoke Japan because the main national goal is to help Britain against Germany. but despite being hesitant to "precipitate anything in the Orient", ultimately agrees.
It is unquestionably to our interest that Britain be not licked - just now she has a stalemate and probably can't do better. We ought to make certain that she at least gets a stalemate. For this she will probably need from us substantial further destroyers and air-reinforcements to England. We should not precipitate anything in the Orient that would hamper our ability to do this - so long as probability continues. If England remains stable, Japan will be cautious in the Orient. Hence our assistance to England in the Atlantic is also protection to her and us in the Orient. However, I concur in your courses of action. We must be ready on both sides and probably strong enough to care for both.
Sourcing: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McCollum_memo#Reception_of_the_Eight_Actions
It is unquestionably to our interest that Britain be not licked - just now she has a stalemate and probably can't do better. We ought to make certain that she at least gets a stalemate. For this she will probably need from us substantial further destroyers and air-reinforcements to England. We should not precipitate anything in the Orient that would hamper our ability to do this - so long as probability continues. If England remains stable, Japan will be cautious in the Orient. Hence our assistance to England in the Atlantic is also protection to her and us in the Orient. However, I concur in your courses of action. We must be ready on both sides and probably strong enough to care for both.
Sourcing: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McCollum_memo#Reception_of_the_Eight_Actions
"The next one was to send a squadron of United States cruisers into Japanese territorial waters, and this was done, and President Roosevelt himself approved the sending the cruisers into the Japanese waters. He said, “I don’t mind losing one or two cruisers, but I don’t want to lose five or six.” What the President was saying there is that I don’t mind losing 900 men, because that’s what was assigned to each cruiser. If you lost two cruisers, that was 1800 men, and that’s about what the Navy lost at Pearl Harbor, 1800 killed. As I mentioned earlier, the death toll was about 2500, so the Navy took the biggest hit on that."
Sourcing: http://www.correntewire.com/fdr_and_pearl_harbor_scott_hortons_2003_interview_of_robert_stinnett_author_of_day_of_deceit
Sourcing: http://www.correntewire.com/fdr_and_pearl_harbor_scott_hortons_2003_interview_of_robert_stinnett_author_of_day_of_deceit